%0 Journal Article
%T Falta de garantias e falhas de coordena£¿£¿o: evid¨ºncias do sistema agroindustrial da carne bovina
%A Caleman
%A Silvia Morales de Queiroz
%A Zylbersztajn
%A Decio
%J Revista de Economia e Sociologia Rural
%D 2012
%I Sociedade Brasileira de Economia e Sociologia Rural
%R 10.1590/S0103-20032012000200002
%X the role of formal and informal institutions in the economy of organizations is traditionally analyzed in terms of efficient governance mechanisms which minimize transaction costs. based on a different perspective, this paper focuses on coordination failures and the problem of lack of guarantees in sequential transactions. in particular, this research examines a bundle of guarantees which supports the transaction between producers and the meatpacking industry in the mato grosso do sul state regarding the inefficiencies in the trading of ready-to-slaughter animals. a theoretical model based on barzel (1997) involving property rights, guarantees and institutions is proposed for the understanding of coordination failures. this model is empirically tested with two multiple logistic regressions: i) an ordered logit model based on the producer's risk perception and ii) a recursive bivariate probit model based on producer's risk perception and on the role of collective action. the findings suggest that formal institutions and collective actions play a relevant role in providing guarantees and, thus, representing a source of transaction costs minimization.
%K coordination failures
%K guarantees
%K complex transactions
%K beef.
%U http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&pid=S0103-20032012000200002&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en