%0 Journal Article
%T Strategy-proof voting rules on a multidimensional policy space for a continuum of voters with elliptic preferences
%A Hans Peters
%A Souvik Roy
%A Ton Storcken
%J SERIEs
%@ 1869-4195
%D 2011
%I 
%R 10.1007/s13209-011-0048-5
%X We consider voting rules on a multidimensional policy space for a continuum of voters with elliptic preferences. Assuming continuity, ¦Ã-strategy-proofness¡ªmeaning that coalitions of size smaller or equal to a small number ¦Ã cannot manipulate¡ªand unanimity, we show that such rules are decomposable into one-dimensional rules. Requiring, additionally, anonymity leads to an impossibility result. The paper can be seen as an extension of the model of Border and Jordan (1983) to a continuum of voters. Contrary, however, to their finite case where single voters are atoms, in our model with nonatomic voters even a small amount of strategy-proofness leads to an impossibility.
%K Strategy-proof voting
%K Continuum of voters
%K Multidimensional policy space
%K Elliptic preferences
%K D71
%K D72
%U http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13209-011-0048-5