%0 Journal Article
%T Objectivities
%A Penelope A Rush
%J Studia Philosophica Estonica
%D 2012
%I University of Tartu
%X I argue that one in particular of Crispin Wright¡¯s attempts to capture our common or intuitive concepts of objectivity, warrant, and other associated notions, relies on an ambiguity between a given constructivist reading of the concepts and at least one other, arguably more ¡®ordinary¡¯, version of the notions he tries to accommodate. I do this by focusing on one case in point, and concluding with a brief argument showing how this case generalises. I demonstrate why this ambiguity is unacceptable and also that its resolution undermines the aim it serves: to account for and accommodate our ordinary conception of (at least) objectivity, warrant (or justification) and truth.
%K language
%K meaning
%K relativism
%U http://www.spe.ut.ee/ojs-2.2.2/index.php/spe/article/view/110/63