%0 Journal Article
%T Truthmakers (are indexed combinations)
%A Wolfgang Freitag
%J Studia Philosophica Estonica
%D 2008
%I University of Tartu
%X My aim is to show that theories which try to construct truthmakers out of objects and properties/relations alone are not tenable: The Frege¨CWittgenstein idea of incompleteness does not yield truthmakers. Armstrong¡¯s theory of partial identity and the theory of moments, i.e., of non-transferable properties, yield truthmakers, but these theories have counter-intuitive consequences. I conclude that the notion of a truthmaker makes ontological demands beyond objects and properties/relations and propose that truthmakers are exemplification relations which are necessarily tied to objects and properties/relations.
%K Bradley's regress
%K truthmakers
%K facts
%U http://www.spe.ut.ee/ojs/index.php/spe/article/download/28/21