%0 Journal Article
%T Peter Railton¡¯s moral realism
%A Milevski Voin
%J Theoria, Beograd
%D 2011
%I Serbian Philosophical Society, Belgrade
%R 10.2298/theo1102079m
%X Peter Railton is a moral realist, a naturalistic cognitivist, and a reductivist. He is a moral relist because he believes that moral facts exist. These moral facts are constituted by a complex set of natural facts (this is why Railton is a naturalistic realist). In order to make his naturalism plausible, Railton has to prove that moral facts (which are constituted by natural facts) can satisfy certain important conditions. Namely, he has to show that moral facts can have both explanatory and normative role. In the first part of this paper I shall attempt to demonstrate Railton¡¯s arguments with which he proves that these conditions are satisfied in the area of non-moral goodness and in the area of moral rightness. In the conclusion of this paper I shall attempt to show that the most serious argument against Railton¡¯s position is that Railton does not and cannot give a plausible answer to some very important questions about moral standards.
%K moral realism
%K naturalism
%K reductionism
%K reforming definition
%K reductive basis
%K objective interest
%K evaluative standards
%U http://www.doiserbia.nb.rs/img/doi/0351-2274/2011/0351-22741102079M.pdf