%0 Journal Article
%T Some objections to Chalmers¡¯ solution to Frege¡¯s puzzle
%A Ostoji£¿ Jelena
%J Theoria, Beograd
%D 2011
%I Serbian Philosophical Society, Belgrade
%R 10.2298/theo1103043o
%X Chalmer¡¯s version of two-dimensional semantics offers interesting and original solutions to traditional problems of neo-Fregean and neo-Russellian theories of meaning. However, I will argue that his theory is not completely successful because it does not solve some important forms of Frege¡¯s puzzle (Mates¡¯ puzzle, and the informativness of identity statements with demonstratives). First I will show that the solution to Mates¡¯ puzzle offered by Chalmers is metalinguistic, and therefore inappropriate since it avoids the problem which is to be solved. Next I will show that the solution makes Chalmers break the compositionality principle, which he says he accepts, and on which some of the main notions of his theory are based. Finally I will point out that Chalmers¡¯ theory cannot account for the informativness of identity statements with demonstratives, no matter whether they are interpreted de dicto or de re.
%K epistemic two-dimensionalism
%K primary and secondary intension
%K enriched proposition
%K Frege¡¯s puzzle
%K Mates¡¯ puzzle
%K demonstratives
%U http://www.doiserbia.nb.rs/img/doi/0351-2274/2011/0351-22741103043O.pdf