%0 Journal Article
%T Contextualism, skepticism, and invariantism
%A Stephen Jacobson
%J Principia : an International Journal of Epistemology
%D 2010
%I Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Brasil
%X Michael Williams and Keith DeRose defend their different versions of contextualism on the grounds that contextualism gives a better account of the ordinary use of epistemic terms than invariantist competitors. One aim of this paper is to explain why their arguments do not succeed. A further aim is to show that the dispute between contextualists and invariantists portrayed by Williams and DeRose is a narrow interpretation of the dispute: there are important contextualist and invariantist positions which fall outside the scope of their arguments and which a full defense of contextualism should consider.
%K Contextualism
%K skepticism
%K invariantism.
%U http://www.periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2010v14n3p375/18711