%0 Journal Article
%T Norms, self-interest and effectiveness: explaining double standards in EU reactions to violations of democratic principles in Sub-Saharan Africa
%A Del Biondo
%A Karen
%J Afrika Focus
%D 2012
%I Gents Afrika Platform, Afrika Brug
%X We found historical and security interests play a role in explaining double standards, while commercial interests do not. The influence of historical interests is surprising, given that many African countries broke away from their former colonizers, while the interest of the latter in ex-colonies has diminished. However, historical interests still seem to play strongly in some former French colonies, including Chad and Ivory Coast. Historical interests can lead to a stronger or weaker preference for sanctions: in Ivory Coast, France was the main driver behind the sanctions imposed on President Gbagbo after he refused to cede power to Raila Odinga following the November 2010 elections. This should be seen in the light of the deterioration of relations between Gbagbo and France in the preceding years. A similar pattern can be observed in Zimbabwe, where tense relations over land reform resulted in the UK¡¯s insistence on strong sanctions in 2002. By way of contrast, earlier intentions by the EU to impose sanctions on Ivory Coast as a reaction to violations of democratic principles were blocked by the French, who hoped to improve relations with President Gbagbo during the first years of his rule. Equally, in Chad, sanctions were `off the table¡ä because of the close relations between President D¨¦by and France. Commercial interests, on the other hand, were not a good predictor for EU¡¯s preference for positive or negative measures. This could be due to the fact that commercial interests were of limited importance in most cases. Furthermore, when commercial interests were important, for example in Nigeria and Niger, they did not conflict with democracy promotion. In Nigeria, EU¡¯s preference for positive measures even ran counter to its commercial interests as Presidents Obasanjo and Jonathan were increasingly displaying nationalistic policies. In Niger, a new exploitation contract had been granted to France, but this did not prevent the EU from imposing sanctions a few months later (Gr¨¦goire, 2011). Security interests were found to play a role. In most countries where the EU took negative measures, except for Kenya, the EU received scant cooperation on security issues. Furthermore, Ethiopia and Nigeria, where the EU was reluctant to use negative measures, were crucial allies of the EU in security affairs. Equally, however, there were cases where the EU did not use negative measures despite the lack of security cooperation (Eritrea) or where the EU threatenedcrucial security allies (Kenya) with negative measures. Finally, we found strong evidence of the importanc
%K Sub-Saharan Africa
%K violations of democratic principles
%K norms
%K self-interest
%K EU reactions
%U http://www.gap.ugent.be/africafocus/pdf/2012Vol25_2_AF_DelBiondo.pdf