%0 Journal Article
%T Naturalistic Moral Realism
%A Matej Susnik
%J Prolegomena
%D 2005
%I Society for the Advancement of Philosophy, Zagreb
%X The subject of this paper is probably the most influential version of moral realism, known as ¡°moral realism naturalism¡±. After I propose what seems to be the most appropriate formulation of moral realism, I discuss whether it is possible to show that moral properties and natural properties can be identified a posteriori. In the second part I try to show that moral realists naturalists cannot refute wellknown Mackie¡¯s ¡°argument from querness¡± (or at least one version of that argument). In the end I discuss whether moral realists naturalists can ascribe the explanatory power to moral properties.
%K Moral properties
%K natural properties
%K considered moral judgments
%K reflective equilibrium
%K supervenience
%K moral explanations
%U http://www.hrstud.hr/prolegomena/Pro-2005-2/Pro-2005-2-Cl-Susnik.pdf