%0 Journal Article
%T Gaunilo's Cogito Argument
%A Miroslav Imbrisevic
%J The Saint Anselm Journal
%D 2007
%I Institute for Saint Anselm Studies
%X Gaunilo presents Anselm with a dilemma in section 7 of his Responsio: I know most certainly that I exist. But If I cannot think my non-existence at the same time, then Anselm's claim in Proslogion 3 (that my inability to think God's non-existence, while knowing most certainly that He exists, is a unique property of God) would be false. If I can do so, however, then I should also be able to know most certainly that God exists and, at the same time, think his non-existence. I will show that Anselm's response to Gaunilo's attack is not adequate because it does not address the issue of certainty, which is at the heart of Gaunilo's objection.
%K Gaunilo
%K Cogito
%K Certainty
%K Ontological Argument
%K Anselm
%U http://www.anselm.edu/Documents/Institute%20for%20Saint%20Anselm%20Studies/Abstracts/4.5.3.2c_51Imbrisevic.pdf