%0 Journal Article
%T Dynamic Collusion and Collusion Games in KnasterĄ¯s Procedure
%A Federica Briata
%A Marco DallĄ¯Aglio
%A Vito Fragnelli
%J AUCO Czech Economic Review
%D 2012
%I Charles University in Prague
%X In this paper we study the collusion in KnasterĄ¯s procedure, starting from the paper of Fragnelli and Marina (2009). First, we introduce a suitable dynamic mechanism, so that the coalition enlargement is always non-disadvantageous. Then, we define a new class of TU-games in order to evaluate the collusion power of the agents.
%K Fairness
%K KnasterĄ¯s procedure
%K complete risk aversion
%K dynamic coalition formation
%U http://auco.cuni.cz/mag/article/download/id/132/type/attachment