%0 Journal Article
%T Bobbio y los Conceptos de Norma Jur赤dicamente 迆ltima
%A Juan Ruiz Manero
%J Sequ那ncia : Estudos Juridicos e Politicos
%D 2012
%I Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina
%X Throughout his very extensive work, Bobbio has repeatedly dealt with the two main versions of the concept of a legally ultimate norm: Kelsen＊s concept of the basic or fundamental norm and the Hart＊s concept of the rule of recognition. In relation to the concept of the basic norm as in relation to the concept of the rule of recognition, Bobbio has argued in some texts that they are absolutely necessary concepts and, in later texts, that these concepts are not only unnecessary but also inadvisable, that they are concepts whose elimination would benefit the resulting theory of law. For the author, legal theory needs to integrate a concept of a legally ultimate norm. Moreover, in the author＊s view, Bobbio＊s propos als to abandon the two main versions of this concept are accompanied by and are inseparable from interpretations which deal with them in a clearly misguided way in the case of the concept of rule of recognition and which are for various reasons not acceptable in the case of the concept of basic norm.Resumen: A lo largo de su extens赤sima obra, Bobbio se ha ocupado en repetidas ocasiones de las dos principales versiones del concepto de norma jur赤dicamente 迆ltima: el concepto de norma b芍sica o fundamental de Kelsen y el concepto de regla de reconocimiento de Hart. Tanto en relaci車n con el concepto de norma b芍sica como en relaci車n con el concepto de regla de reconocimiento Bobbio ha defendido 每en unos textos每 que se trataba de conceptos imprescindibles y tambi谷n 每en textos posteriores每 que se trataba de conceptos no s車lo innecesarios sino inconvenientes, de conceptos de cuya eliminaci車n se beneficiar赤a la teor赤a del derecho resultante. A juicio del autor, la teor赤a del derecho necesita integrar un concepto de norma jur赤dicamente 迆ltima. Y, tambi谷n a juicio del autor, las propuestas bobbianas de abandonar las dos principales versiones de este concepto van acompa adas y resultan inseparables de interpretaciones de una y otra que resultan claramente desencaminadas en el caso del concepto de regla de reconocimiento y por diversas razones no aceptables en el caso del concepto de norma b芍sica.
%K Bobbio
%K Kelsen
%K Hart
%K Basic norm Rule of recognition
%K Bobbio
%K Kelsen
%K Hart
%K Norma b芍sica
%K Regla de reconocimiento
%U http://www.periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/sequencia/article/view/2177-7055.2012v33n64p39/22464