%0 Journal Article
%T The practicality of pure reason. A normative defence of Kant¡¯s theory of moral motivation.
%A Triantafyllos Gkouvas
%J Eidos
%D 2011
%I Universidad del Norte
%X The purpose of this paper is to defend the view that Kant has propounded an internalist theory of moral motivation. In particular, I shall argue that Kant¡¯s espousal of internalism is evidenced by his claim that pure reason¡¯s relation to the will is premised on a practical synthetic a priori proposition. What I aim to demonstrate is that Kant treated practical syntheticity as a pivotal concept for his account of what it means to be motivated by principles of pure reason. On my construal of Kant¡¯s motivational theory, the relation between universalizable maxims and the moral interest to act upon them is necessary but non-tautological, since violations of duty are logically possible despite our having a moral reason to act. What prevents the latter argument from collapsing into a quasiexternalist account of moral motivation is that the motivational impact of law-like maxims is ultimately premised on a normative conception of ourselves as free agents.
%K Moral motivation
%K moral judgment
%K pure reason
%K will
%K autonomy
%K Kant
%U http://rcientificas.uninorte.edu.co/index.php/eidos/article/view/2142/1379