%0 Journal Article %T The Foreground and Background of Consciousness %A Mara van der Lugt %J Erasmus Student Journal of Philosophy %D 2011 %I Erasmus University, Rotterdam %X This paper questions the tendency of philosophers, especially in the free will debate, to posit a certain experience of the self as introspectively obvious. It will attempt to demonstrate that introspection can create an experience of the self that is different from self-experience prior to introspection: hence, that introspection can distort self-experience. It will be argued that although there is room for the use of introspection in phenomenology and philosophy, this use should be continually questioned and open to re-examination. The concepts of a foreground and background will be introduced as a more productive way of understanding and visualising consciousness. %U http://www.eur.nl/fileadmin/ASSETS/fw/ESJP/ESJP.1.2011.01.Lugt.pdf