%0 Journal Article
%T Moral Responsibility and the Principle of Avoidable Blame
%A Gerald K. Harrison
%J Ethic@ : an International Journal for Moral Philosophy
%D 2004
%I Universitade Federal de Santa Catarina
%X Many now accept that Frankfurt-style cases refute the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP). But, in this paper I argue that even if Frankfurt-style cases refute PAP they do not refute a related principle: the principle of avoidable blame (PAB). My argument develops from the observation that an agent in a Frankfurt-style case can be aware of the nature of their situation without this undermining their moral responsibility. I then argue that PAB captures all that is important about PAP such that the refutation of PAP is of no concern as long as PAB survives.
%K moral responsability
%K blame
%K Frankfurt-style cases.
%U http://www.cfh.ufsc.br/ethic@/et31art3.pdf