%0 Journal Article
%T Does a Least-Preferred Candidate Win a Seat? A Comparison of Three Electoral Systems
%A Yoichi Hizen
%J Economies
%P 2-36
%D 2015
%I MDPI AG
%R 10.3390/economies3010002
%X In this paper, the differences between two variations of proportional representation (PR), open-list PR and closed-list PR, are analyzed in terms of their ability to accurately reflect voter preference. The single nontransferable vote (SNTV) is also included in the comparison as a benchmark. We construct a model of voting equilibria with a candidate who is least preferred by voters in the sense that replacing the least-preferred candidate in the set of winners with any loser is Pareto improving, and our focus is on whether the least-preferred candidate wins under each electoral system. We demonstrate that the least-preferred candidate never wins under the SNTV, but can win under open-list PR, although this is less likely than winning under closed-list PR.
%K open list
%K closed list
%K proportional representation
%K single nontransferable vote
%K voting equilibria
%U http://www.mdpi.com/2227-7099/3/1/2