%0 Journal Article
%T Process Externalism and mental causation: setting metaphysical bounds on cognitive science
%A Camilo Ramirez Motoa
%J Adaptive Behavior
%@ 1741-2633
%D 2019
%R 10.1177/1059712318793836
%X In this article, I examine the argument by which Process Externalism¡ªan interesting empirical theory that echoes 4E¡¯s core ideas¡ªundermines Kim¡¯s supervenience argument. If mental properties do not depend exclusively on neurological properties but depend on external or extra-cranial properties, mental causation cannot be pre-empted by or reduced to neurological properties. In this sense, Keijzer and Schouten argue that this theory entails a robust nonreductive materialism (RNM) that vindicates a notion of mental causation. However, I will argue that this maneuver produces different kinds of overdetermination problems that compromise the metaphysical austerity of a materialist theory of cognition and, for this reason, Process Externalism might not be conceived as entailing an RNM. Finally, I will suggest that the theory could be rendered as a moderate reductive account of the cognitive phenomena that would avoid the overdetermination problems that haunt nonreductive accounts of cognition
%K Supervenience argument
%K Process Externalism
%K mental causation
%K robust nonreductive materialism
%K causal overdetermination
%K non-causal overdetermination
%U https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1059712318793836