%0 Journal Article
%T Leader Survival Strategies and the Onset of Civil Conflict: A Coup
%A Jonathan Powell
%J Armed Forces & Society
%@ 1556-0848
%D 2019
%R 10.1177/0095327X17728493
%X It is paradoxical that authoritarian leaders often hold power for long periods of time, despite their states being plagued with rebellion. Scholarship has argued the practice of coup-proofing is potentially responsible for this trend. However, though regular armed forces are often allowed to whither when coup-proofing, states often retain substantial capabilities in the form of well-armed and well-trained coup-proofing units. This article argues that coup-proofing is more likely to contribute to rebellion when leaders are hesitant to deploy their coup-proofing units: when coup risk is high. Using a global sample of authoritarian regimes for the years 1971¨C2011, tests indicate that heavily coup-proofed regimes do in fact see a considerable increase in civil war likelihood when the risk of a coup is high but see no change in conflict propensity when coup risk is low
%K civil¨Cmilitary relations
%K coups and conflicts
%K military effectiveness
%K civil wars
%K coup-proofing
%U https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0095327X17728493