%0 Journal Article
%T Social enactivism about perception¡ªreply to McGann
%A Alejandro Arango
%J Adaptive Behavior
%@ 1741-2633
%D 2019
%R 10.1177/1059712319835162
%X In his comment, McGann argues that in my ¡°From Sensorimotor Dependencies to Perceptual Practices: Making Enactivism Social,¡± I have overlooked a group of enactivist theories that can be grouped under the participatory sense-making label. In this reply, I explain that the omission is due to the fact that such theories are not accounts of perception. It is argued that, unlike participatory sense-making, the approach of the ¡°From Sensorimotor Dependencies to Perceptual Practices¡± article does not focus on the perceptual aspects of things social, but on the social aspects that are constitutive of perception in general. I conclude by underscoring the central argument of the original article: that the adequate notion to make enactivism about perception social is that of ¡°perceptual practices,¡± a social practices-based notion of perception
%K Enactivism
%K perception
%K sociality
%K practices
%K intersubjectivity
%K culture
%U https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1059712319835162