%0 Journal Article
%T Incorporating others: what an extended self tells us about intersubjectivity
%A Maria Clara Garavito
%J Adaptive Behavior
%@ 1741-2633
%D 2019
%R 10.1177/1059712318789921
%X Incorporation is the body¡¯s capacity to take something to alter or extend itself. In the literature on the subject, there is a lively debate on what constitutes incorporation. According to the Hypothesis of Extended Mind, whatever extends our cognitive processes is incorporated. At the same time, that object becomes a part of our self-manifestation. However, De Preester, in what I call a narrow version of incorporation, proposes that an object is incorporated to the self only if it is included in the sense of ownership of the body. Here, I explore a broader version of incorporation, related to Merleau-Ponty¡¯s ideas of habit and incorporation. From this perspective, incorporation is the way a self expands and alters itself in its dealings with the world. A self, as a lived body, emerges in the self¡¯s constitutive openness to worlds; therefore, objects (and even others) are incorporated in a temporal and situated way if they participate in constitutive experiences. Finally, this perspective explores the idea of a flexible and transparent self rather than a fixed self based on representations of the body
%K Extended mind
%K sense of ownership
%K intercorporeality
%K incorporation
%K extended self
%K lived body
%U https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1059712318789921