%0 Journal Article
%T The Cognitive/Noncognitive Debate in Emotion Theory: A Corrective From Spinoza
%A Renee England
%J Emotion Review
%@ 1754-0747
%D 2019
%R 10.1177/1754073918798038
%X An intractable problem that characterizes the contemporary philosophical discussion of emotion is whether emotions are fundamentally cognitive or noncognitive. In this article, I will establish that this problem arises from the influence of an underlying philosophical anthropology that entails a mind/body ¡°split¡± ultimately inherited from Cartesianism, and further show that it can be fruitfully addressed by adopting a contemporary construal of the self and emotions derived from the philosophy of a key critic of Descartes¡¯ dualism, Spinoza
%K cognitive
%K emotions
%K noncognitive
%K philosophical psychology
%K Spinoza
%K split self
%U https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1754073918798038