%0 Journal Article
%T The democratic deficit and European Central Bank crisis monetary policies
%A Anna-Lena H£¿genauer
%A David Howarth
%J Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law
%@ 2399-5548
%D 2019
%R 10.1177/1023263X18824776
%X This article presents the argument that European Central Bank (ECB) policy-making from the start of the sovereign debt crisis in 2010 undermined the democratic legitimacy of the ECB. We start with the argument ¨C defended by a number of scholars including Majone and Moravcsik ¨C that where European Union (EU) policy-making is technocratic and does not have significant redistributive implications it can benefit from depoliticization that does not undermine the democratic legitimacy of this policy-making. This is notably the case where EU institutions have narrow mandates and are constrained by super-majoritarian decision-making. Prior to the international financial crisis, the ECB¡¯s monetary policies were shaped entirely by the interpretation that its mandate was primarily to ensure low inflation. From the outbreak of the sovereign debt crisis, the ECB adopted a range of policies which pushed its role well beyond that interpretation and engaged in a form of redistribution that directly undermined treaty provisions
%K European Central Bank
%K monetary policy
%K Euro
%K sovereign debt crisis
%K legitimacy
%K democracy
%K transparency
%U https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1023263X18824776