%0 Journal Article
%T The Ideas of the Self and Time in Hume: Are these Two Ideas Reconcilable?
%A Volkan £¿ifteci
%J -
%D 2019
%X Abstract: The Cartesian/Substantial self (the traditional self) is a view which holds that the self is an agent who is the subject of all our mental states, i.e., thoughts, perceptions and so on. It also holds that the self is identical to itself at different times. However, on Hume¡¯s account, we have no such idea. That is, the self preserving its identity through time is a fiction. Hume states that all ideas must be derived from impressions (the Copy Principle). Nevertheless, there is no such persisting impression; so, there is no idea of the persisting self. However, even though, there is no single impression of time that corresponds to the idea of time, Hume argues that we do have the idea of time. This paper investigates Hume¡¯s view that the self is an illusion by concentrating on the role of (associative) imagination and memory. Furthermore, it aims to clarify Hume¡¯s idea of time. It appears that the ideas of the self and time are co-dependent. Yet, Hume rejects that we have the idea of the persisting self; whereas, he admits that we have the idea of time. Considering the Copy Principle, it appears that there is an inconsistency between the two claims at issue. The present paper also discusses whether this inconsistency can be remedied
%K kendilik
%K zaman
%K yan£¿lsama
%K ger£¿eklik
%K uzla£¿t£¿r£¿labilirlik
%U http://dergipark.org.tr/metazihin/issue/46637/569120