%0 Journal Article
%T 区块链技术背景下风险规避型跨国供应链决策研究<br>Research on Risk Aversion Multinational Supply Chain Decision under the Background of Blockchain Technology
%A 李凡
%A 陈磊
%J World Economic Research
%P 1-18
%@ 2167-6615
%D 2023
%I Hans Publishing
%R 10.12677/WER.2023.121001
%X 在跨国供应链的发展历程中，各跨国企业可能会面临产品质量、贸易安全、税收差异等难题，一些平台开始利用区块链进行安全认证。本文研究了一个由位于高税收国家的跨国企业和从跨国企业采购并转售货物的电子零售商组成的合作供应链，电子零售商在低税收国家与跨国企业的零售部门竞争。研究表明，动态环境下，跨国企业的风险规避行为导致区块链技术应用程度、批发价格、电子零售商及跨国企业零售部门销售价格降低，但零售商的风险规避行为会导致批发价格升高。此外，在跨国企业风险规避时，区块链投入最低，决策更加保守，批发价与跨国企业零售部门销售价均最低。在供应链主体均风险规避且运用成本分担契约时，区块链投入努力最高，供应链效用也最高，该契约可有效协调供应链。<br />
With the development of multinational supply chain, multinational enterprises may face problems such as product quality, trade security, and tax differences. Some platforms use blockchain for security certification. This paper studies a cooperative supply chain consisting of multinational en-terprises located in high-tax countries and e-retailers that purchase and resell goods from multina-tional enterprises. E-retailers compete with the retail sector of multinational enterprises in low-tax countries. The research shows that under the dynamic environment, the risk aversion of multinational enterprises leads to the reduction of blockchain technology application, wholesale prices, e-retailers and retail sales prices of multinational enterprises, but the risk aversion of retailers leads to the increase of wholesale prices. In addition, when multinational enterprises are risk aversion, the investment in the blockchain is the lowest, the decision-making is more conservative, and the wholesale price and the retail sales price of multinational enterprises are both the lowest. When the supply chain entities are risk aversion and the cost-sharing contract is used, the blockchain has the highest investment effort and the supply chain has the highest utility. The contract can effectively coordinate the supply chain.
%K 跨国供应链，区块链技术，风险规避，成本共担契约，微分博弈<br>Multinational Supply Chain
%K Blockchain Technology
%K Risk Aversion
%K Cost-Sharing Contract
%K Differential Game
%U http://www.hanspub.org/journal/PaperInformation.aspx?PaperID=62106