%0 Journal Article
%T 零售商主导下供应链信息策略及减排激励研究<br>Research on Supply Chain Information Strategy and Emission Reduction Incentive under Retailer’s Leading
%A 肖莉莉
%A 王晓锋
%J Management Science and Engineering
%P 116-130
%@ 2167-6658
%D 2024
%I Hans Publishing
%R 10.12677/MSE.2024.131011
%X 本文基于碳税环境下的二级服装供应链结构，考虑制造商私有减排信息同时零售商私有需求信息，探究制造商的减排信息谎报和零售商的需求信息共享策略及其对供应链减排和利润的影响，并设计零售商主导下提升供应链减排的激励契约。研究表明：当零售商掌握供应链的话语权时，制造商没有谎报减排信息的动机；无论市场状态高低，零售商均愿意共享信息，仅有市场状态高时信息共享有利于供应链减排但和集中决策相比存在效益损失。进而针对市场状态为高时，设计成本分担–收益共享契约，可促进供应链的减排提升同时供应链总体利润增长，且零售商可以通过控制收益共享比例来进行供应链的利润分配。<br />
Based on the structure of the second-level garment supply chain under the carbon tax environment, this paper considers the manufacturer’s private emission reduction information and the retailer’s private demand information, explores the manufacturer’s emission reduction information misreporting and retailer’s demand information sharing strategies and their impact on supply chain emission reduction and profits, and designs incentive contracts to promote supply chain emission reduction under the leadership of retailers. The research shows that when retailers have the right to speak in the supply chain, manufacturers have no incentive to lie about emission reduction information; Retailers are willing to share information no matter the market state is high or low. Only when the market state is high, information sharing is conducive to supply chain emission reduction, but there is benefit loss compared with centralized decision-making. Furthermore, when the market state is high, the design of cost-sharing—revenue sharing contract can promote the emission reduction of the supply chain and the overall profit growth of the supply chain, and retailers can control the proportion of revenue sharing to carry out the profit distribution of the supply chain.
%K 激励契约，减排信息谎报，需求信息共享<br>Incentive Contract
%K Misrepresentation of Emission Reduction Information
%K Demand Information Sharing
%U http://www.hanspub.org/journal/PaperInformation.aspx?PaperID=79491