%0 Journal Article
%T La voluntad de no creer
%A Hern¨¢ndez Iglesias
%A Manuel
%J An£¿£¿lisis filos£¿3fico
%D 2007
%I Scientific Electronic Library Online
%X is it rational to believe something because one wants to believe it? prima facie it is not, for a rational belief is based on reasons, and the will to believe can be a cause, but not a reason for the belief. nevertheless, some attempts of causally self-inducing beliefs can be viewed as a sort of second-order rationality. this paper sketches a view of this second-order rationality based on davidson's thesis of the divided mind and ortega's distinction between ideas and beliefs. the uncomfortable conclusion of the discussion is that the ability to have second-order beliefs about our beliefs is what makes possible both self-criticism and self-improvement and dogmatism and self-corruption and that the possibility condition of rationality and freedom and of irrationality and alienation are the same.
%K rationality
%K will
%K beliefs
%K self-deception
%K divided mind.
%U http://www.scielo.org.ar/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&pid=S1851-96362007000100001&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en