%0 Journal Article
%T Quando leis n£¿o produzem os resultados esperados: financiamento eleitoral em perspectiva comparada
%A Marenco
%A Andr¨¦
%J Dados
%D 2010
%I Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro
%R 10.1590/S0011-52582010000400002
%X democracies have adopted different legislative models to regulate election finance: maximum limits to contributions, bans on donations by companies that provide public services or operate government concessions, and disclosure of private donations and public funds to cover campaign expenditures. the current study's underlying hypothesis is that there is no association between the legislation's rigor and improvement in indicators of institutional transparency. the study analyzes the extent to which different types of institutional formats like democracy, presidentialism, type of electoral slate, and size of voting districts, as well as economic development variables, can explain the failure of electoral legislation to produce transparency in election finance.
%K electoral legislation
%K election finance
%K transparency.
%U http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&pid=S0011-52582010000400002&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en