La conexión subnacional: geografía del voto y coaliciones electorales en el federalismo brasile？o

this paper proposes to inquire on the stability and change of electoral coalitions in national legislative elections in brazil. we argue that the definition of territorial patterns of voting of both political parties and individual candidates is strongly associated with the government-opposition cleavage at the state level. in brazilian federalism, state governments control formal and informal resources that allow them to exert substantial influence in the mobilization of local party networks and voters in "pro-incumbent" localities. the role of the state governor's coalition in legislative elections is shaped by national-local processes of cooperation and competition. when the governor is not allied with the federal government, the local opposition may take advantage of their access to federal policy and patronage to boost the performance of candidates to the federal chamber. conversely, when the governor's coalition reproduces the national coalition, candidates affiliated with the coalition parties enjoy a much greater competitive advantage compared to the opposition. these patterns reflect institutional characteristics of brazilian democracy, especially regarding the centrality of national and state executives in the governing process and in the electoral arena. the paper analyzes the geography of the vote of government and opposition parties in three states of the federation -río grande del norte, minas gerais and bahía- from 1998 to 2006.