Falta de garantias e falhas de coordena？？o: evidências do sistema agroindustrial da carne bovina

the role of formal and informal institutions in the economy of organizations is traditionally analyzed in terms of efficient governance mechanisms which minimize transaction costs. based on a different perspective, this paper focuses on coordination failures and the problem of lack of guarantees in sequential transactions. in particular, this research examines a bundle of guarantees which supports the transaction between producers and the meatpacking industry in the mato grosso do sul state regarding the inefficiencies in the trading of ready-to-slaughter animals. a theoretical model based on barzel (1997) involving property rights, guarantees and institutions is proposed for the understanding of coordination failures. this model is empirically tested with two multiple logistic regressions: i) an ordered logit model based on the producer's risk perception and ii) a recursive bivariate probit model based on producer's risk perception and on the role of collective action. the findings suggest that formal institutions and collective actions play a relevant role in providing guarantees and, thus, representing a source of transaction costs minimization.