La contradicción en Hegel

in this paper, i argue against the idea of dealing with hegel's philosophy as if it were based on obscure and inexplicable principles that can only be accepted as a fact for which no rational or philosophical explanation is available. in order to do it, i consider the aspect of hegel's method which is connected with the concept of contradiction. hegel's own conceptions of contradiction and objects can be considered as criticism of traditional metaphysics. the shortcomings of traditional metaphysics are seen by hegel as a consequence of its incautious use of the subject-predicate structure of language which, as he holds, is inappropriate to express something true about objects as they really are; nevertheless, hegel is convinced, at the same time, that this way of speaking about objects is unavoidable. hegel tries to solve the resulting dilemma by introducing the concept of contradiction as a methodological rule by means of which the deficiencies of traditional metaphysics could be avoided.