Indistinguibilidade, n？o reflexividade, ontologia e física quantica

it has been taken as reasonable to assume that, insofar as we deal with objects that lie beyond the formalism of physical theories, quantum physics commits us to an ontology of entities that can be assumed to be both absolutely indistinguishable and, in a sense, as lacking individuality. in this article, first, we briefly and generally consider the nature of this commitment, by discussing how it can be understood in metaphysical terms, as well as its relationship with the logical systems employed to talk about the objects to which we are committed. then we present some of the main aspects of orthodox quantum mechanics that are usually employed to provide arguments for suggesting an ontology of objects having these features, that is, of objects that are both indistinguishable and have no individuality. finally, we sketch the main features of quasi-set theory, a system of set theory, for the purpose of capturing formally these features in a natural way, and for employing it as the underlying logic for grounding a metaphysics of non-individuals.