Libertad de la voluntad y poderes causales

this paper discusses a well-known objection to libertarian free will in a non-deterministic world. in a non-deterministic world the complete state of affairs of the world in an instant of time t is compatible with different alternative complete states of affairs in the future of t. it has been argued that, in so far as different alternatives are possible to a free decision, it is a matter of chance and luck that that decision is taken. if a free decision is a matter of luck, then the agent cannot be considered responsible for it. it is argued that the difficulty appears from an anti-realist conception of causality, where causal facts are supervenient on regularities or counterfactual dependences. a realist conception of causality can, then, explain how the agent is causally in control of the free decision taken when the decision does not fall under a regularity or a counterfactual dependence. once considered how the agent is in control of the decision, it is argued that one cannot say that the free decision is a matter of luck for the agent.