ANALYSIS OF THE MARKET OLIGOPOLISTIC MODEL (ON AN EXAMPLE OF AN ELECTRICITY MARKET IN MEXICO)

Numerical experiments based upon the oligopolistic model of electricity market applied in Mexico have been conducted. The Mexican electricity market is presented by state regulated monopoly, thus, a competitive market is not yet established. Possible liberalization effects for Mexican market have been evaluated. An oligopolistic market structure emerges from the energy market analysis and is characterized not only by the mutual influence on market prices but also by the limited number of firms-producers at the market. Cournot-Nash model electricity firms maximize their profit and enlarge their market share. To compare a notion of perfect competition, where each agent controls prices equalizing them and marginal costs in order to maximize its profit. The game modeling tool, composed of mixed complementary problems (MCP), solved by the GAMS algorithm PATH has been suggested. Mexican electricity market data have been analyzed by means of this model to obtain Nash equilibrium in the perfect competition and Cournot cases, as well as open market scenario with international trade with USA.