Wittgenstein o externych koreňoch logiky (Wittgenstein on External Roots of Logic)

The problem of the epistemological status of logic lies at the centre of Wittgenstein’s philosophical concern with logic. There are two known solutions to this problem: apriorism and aposteriorism. Apriorism represents our logical operations as expressions of purely a priori relations between elements of a certain kind. There is an opposition to this solution, denying that our logical operations can be understood as the expressions of purely a priori relations between the elements. It appears that one solution or the other must be true. It is believed by scholars that the early Wittgenstein’s view of the epistemological status of logic is a version of apriorism. The aim of the present paper is to provide an adequate reconstruction of the later Wittgenstein’s solution to this philosophical problem. The main question behind this paper is: Providing that there is a disagreement between the two Wittgenstein’s views of the epistemological status of logic, must the later position be an example of aposteriorism? The suggested answer is: No. The later Wittgenstein’s position questions the conceptual framework of this whole philosophical discussion.