Pain asymbolia

The main object of this paper is a rare syndrome in human pain experience, known as the pain asymbolia. The first thing that will be considered in this paper is the nature of pain asymbolia. I will try to examine and prove professor Grahek's claim that pain asymbolia differs from other dissociation syndromes in human pain experience. Also, the special attention will be given to Grahek's claim that typical cases of indifference to pain are not the cases of radical or total indifference to pain. Finally, it will be shown how pain asymbolia can be used against some famous arguments in the philosophy of mind. Namely, it can be used to undermine both the subjectivist and the objectivist conceptions of pain. More specifically, it can be used to disprove the functionalist interpretation of pain and the perceptual or representational model of pain. Also, pain asymbolia can be used against the subjectivist view, according to which the sensation of pain is to be considered as the essential component of pain.