Grounded Theory and the Phenomenological Approach in Social Sciences. An Epistemological Controversy upon the Building of Concepts in Grounded Theory: the Forgotten Concept of Intentionality

The study is focused upon the way in which Grounded Theory’s general frame is considering the process of conceptualization in its relation with the empirical original data. It is centered upon the issue of building the first conceptual level in order to obtain further theoretical development. The analysis begins with a description of the Grounded Theory’s way of conceiving the relation between the contact with the empirical data and the first appearance of the conceptualization process. We argue that is not possible to sustain an autonomous methodology, in the way in which this is considered by the Grounded Theory, in order to obtain the theoretical level. The argument shows that, in terms of a phenomenological epistemological perspective, the belief that a researcher would ever be able to approach the empirical data without having a form of preconception, regardless how general this one could be, about the empirical data, could never be properly sustained. Our study shows that intentionality, with all its consequences upon any form of theoretical development, will be always present in any scientific methodology which could be ever accepted in the social research field. We defend the idea that is not possible to accept, at the most fundamental level, the possibility of coexistence of two different methodologies such are the Grounded Theory and the Phenomenological approach. We argue that phenomenological approach is inherent at the most basic level of any social research. We reject the possibility of a methodological mix at the level of contact with the empirical data.