“Resemblance Argument” and Controversies over Mimesis

Contrary to the common interpretation of Platonic art that supports the view that it is ontologically and gnoseologically irrelevant because it is mainly defined by mimetic concept as a mere imitation of the material world, and is therefore banished from the Republic, we will offer some different interpretations. Namely, it is possible to show that mimetic principle is not the reason why Plato condemns art, and that the notion of artistic mimesis in fact stems from the metaphysical notion of mimesis as approximation or gradual resemblance to the paradigm. In this case artistic mimesis achieves higher ontological authenticity and imitates the ideal by means of the sensory. Parmenides’ “resemblance argument” may constitute a serious obstacle for the acceptance of, on the one hand, the idea of the relation of resemblance (homoiotes) between Forms and particulars, that is between the paradigm and its image, and on the other hand it may question the idea of approximation in which mimetic principle has metaphysical foundation. However, when Form is seen as a synthetic unity of many things (hen epi pollon), it then represents the right standpoint for the explanation of the phenomena, and it becomes questionable when it is placed on the same level with its exemplars. If the relation of resemblance between the paradigm and its image is determined by the “dynamic”, and not by “symmetric resemblance” in which both parts are on the same level of ontological authenticity, then the view of philosophical mimesis as approximation on which relies artistic mimetic concept is legitimate.