Israeli Naval Power: An Essential Factor in the Operational Battlefield

Although the State of Israel has always been threatened from the sea, preparing for the threat was not an important priority for the state’s leaders, as re ected by the resources that were allocated to the navy. However, once long range missiles appeared in the naval arena (in the 1960s), it became clear that the navy’s vessels and the air force’s planes were not capable of coping with this challenge. In light of the current upheaval in the Arab world, these fears are far from illusory. Even countries belonging to the “third circle” such as Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, Iran, and Yemen could attack Israeli shipping, since they have the capability to reach the maritime area off of Israel’s coasts without great dif culty and to re weapons from afar. Under the cover of large distances from Israel, they can support maritime terrorist cells operating against Israel and send weapons shipments, as some, including Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, and Iran, have indeed done. It was not possible, and this is still true today, to act effectively against this entire range of threats through the IDF’s ground and air forces, and therefore, the navy, which underwent a major buildup beginning in the late 1970s, was required to provide a suitable professional and operational answer to these signi cant new threats.