In this paper we discuss Floridi’s views concerning semantic information in the light of a recent contribution (in collaboration with the present author) [1] that defies the traditional view of deductive reasoning as “analytic” or “tautological” and construes it as an informative, albeit non-empirical, activity. We argue that this conception paves the way for a more realistic notion of semantic information where the “ideal agents” that are assumed by the standard view can be indefinitely approximated by real ones equipped with growing computational resources.
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