Natura relacji epistemicznej (The nature of epistemic relation)

The article begins with the question concerning the relation between the so called definition of knowledge (E. Gettier) and the epistemic relation but its main part aims at showing what are the most important constituents of this relation (constituents of the idea of knowledge in general). Fundamental for the possibility of epistemic relation is the presence of some kind of conscious subject. In this context critical remarks are considered concerning contemporary naturalistic approaches to the idea of knowledge where the possibility of wholly unconscious cognition (knowledge) has been seriously taken into account (e.g. robots capable of adaptive behavior in some environment). The second essential element of epistemic relation is the existence of some object (content), which conscious subject must be capable to grasp. The extent of the concept of object (content) cannot be limited to the realm of physical things because epistemic relation also allows for the presence of abstract objects. It also allows for the presence of objects wholly unknown to human cognizing subjects. On the one hand, taken as such, epistemic relation does not possess any causal character, but on the other hand it can be based on some causal relation. It can also ‘assimilate’ other than physical kinds of conditioning, e.g. exemplifi cation of properties understood in a platonic sense. As a necessary constituent of each kind of epistemic relation must be treated the element of representation and here it stressed the importance of the distinction between subject of epistemic relation on the one hand and the ‘mind’ that this subject ‘possesses’, ‘mind’ interpreted as a system of representations. To the necessary elements of each epistemic relation belongs the activity of categorization but this categorization does to have to be ofsemantic character and it must not contain two fundamental forms of human intuition, i.e. space and time. Other forms of intuition, wholly unknown to human subjects, are also possible as constituents of epistemic relation. Truth also must be taken as the necessary element of epistemic relation and here I try to show the importance of the distinction between truth in the judgmental sense (propositional truth) and truth in the pre-judgmental (pre-propositional) sense (passive or receptive truth). In this context arguments are considered for the thesis that for all fi nite subjects each particular cognition is true in this pre-judgmental sense.