wiadomo fenomenalna a problem intencjonalno ci. O intencjonalno ci fenomalnej (Phenomenal Consciousness and the Problem of Intentionality. About Phenomenal Intentionality)

The article concerns the problem of how to understand the relationship between phenomenal consciousness and intentionality or mental content – an issue that, until recently, has been neglected by many analytic philosophers of mind. I distinguish two ways of theoretically establishing the phenomenal-intentional relation: reductive one, which I equate with so called phenomenal externalism and non-reductive one, which is based on the idea that there is a kind of intentionality – i.e. phenomenal intentionality – that is phenomenally constituted. I argue for the second of these options. Following the work of philosophers such as G. Graham, T. Horgan, U. Kriegel, J. Tienson and B. Loar, I try to show that (1) phenomenal intentionality actually exists, (2) that content of phenomenally intentional states is narrow and (3) that both previous theses are compatible with moderate externalism about mental content.