Wittgenstein y Gadamer: Convergencias, contraposiciones y tensiones en torno de la noción de juego de lenguaje

Despite the echos that the notion of ‘linguistic game’ in the second Wittgenstein may have in Gadamer’s own conception of play, it is necessary to clarify not just some of the differences between them, but also the effects that follow from them in relation to the processes of comprehension and interpretation. Indeed, for Gadamer the emphasis is placed in historical consciousness; the notion of play is impossible to dissociate from those of ‘transmitted content’ and ‘world experience’, whose interplay constitutes the horizon within which the hermeneutic experience takes place. For Wittgenstein, on the other hand, the notion of a ‘game’ denotes the rules through which a form of life is structured, and forms part of a general reflection on the very possibility of meaning that sets itself against the notion of interpretation. In the present work we shall identify agreements and oppositions with a view to renovating the dialogue between traditions whose differences, far from distancing them, may contribute to enriching the debate in the problem of comprehension.