Norris Clarke and Sarah Borden on the Limitation of Existence or Why We Are Not God: A Response

Both Borden and I are suspicious of Clarke's 'thin theory' of essence, the view that essences which limit creaturely existence have no positive reality of their own. I examine Clarke's reasons for holding this position, among which is the desire to avoid a metaphysical monism in which the otherness of God and creation is undermined. Borden thinks problems arise with Clarke's model because of the tendency to over-spatialize it. I think the problem is deeper and originates from the fact that the first concept of the human intellect is a compound one, ens or that-which-is, and Clarke's theory requires that we somehow get below that which is most fundamental in our thinking. Borden wants to ground the reality of essences in the ideas in God's mind, but recognizes this just invites the further question-how do God's ideas differ from God. I suggest a more promising solution lies in construing the relation of divine and creaturely otherness as non-commutative.