Findings from cross-cultural theory-of-mind studies highlight potential measurement effects and both general (e.g., East-West) and specific (e.g., pedagogical experiences) cultural contrasts. We compared theory-of-mind scores for children from UK and Italy (two Western countries that differ in age of school entry) and Japan (a Far-Eastern country in which children, like their Italian counterparts, start school later than British children). Confirmatory factor analysis was applied to data from 268 age-gender- and verbal ability-matched 5- to 6-year olds. Key findings were that (i) all 8 indicators loaded onto a single latent factor; and (ii) this latent factor explained significant variance in each group, with just one indicator showing differential item functioning. Supporting the importance of pedagogical experiences, British children outperformed both their Italian and Japanese counterparts. 1. Introduction Individual differences in the rate at which children acquire a theory of mind appear important for children’s success at school [1, 2] and for relationships with friends (e.g., [3]) and peers [4, 5]. However, the lion’s share of research on individual differences in children’s understanding of mind has focused on the origins of individual differences. As documented in recent reviews (e.g., [6, 7]) much of this research has concerned structural family factors, such as number of siblings [8] or overall family size [9], or more qualitative family factors, such as frequency of maternal talk about mental states (e.g., [10–12]) or cooperative interactions with siblings [13, 14]. Beyond the family, other studies have shown that variation in conversations about mental states with friends [15] and children’s social acceptance by their peer group [4] also predict individual differences in children’s performance on tests of theory of mind. Alongside this research on extrafamilial social influences is a marked expansion in the geographical scope of theory-of-mind research, such that accounts that emphasize universality (e.g., [16, 17]) have been challenged on several fronts. Specifically, meta-analytic findings indicate that Asian children lag significantly behind American and British children on false-belief tasks [18]. In addition, children from different cultures appear to vary not only in the rate but also in the order in which they achieve distinct milestones within theory of mind. For example, while children from individualistic cultures typically acquire an understanding of the subjective nature of belief before they appreciate constraints on knowledge,
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