Since the terrorist attacks and anthrax release in 2001, almost $32 billion has been allocated to biodefense and biosurveillance in the USA alone. Surveillance in health care refers to the continual systematic collection, analysis, interpretation, and dissemination of data. When attempting to detect agents of bioterrorism, surveillance can occur in several ways. Syndromic surveillance occurs by monitoring clinical manifestations of certain illnesses. Laboratory surveillance occurs by looking for certain markers or laboratory data, and environmental surveillance is the process by which the ambient air or environment is continually sampled for the presence of biological agents. This paper focuses on the ways by which we detect bioterrorism agents and the effectiveness of these systems. 1. Introduction Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the anthrax release in the following month, there has been a heightened interest in bioterrorism surveillance. The years immediately following these attacks were met with increased awareness and funding from the federal government. This paper will focus on the methods that we can use to prepare ourselves and detect these bioagent attacks. The anthrax attacks of 2001, the SARS outbreak in 2004, and the recent H1N1 Influenza outbreak remind us that an essential component of preparedness for bioterrorism includes surveillance methods that can detect and monitor the course of an outbreak and thus minimize associated morbidity and mortality [1]. Surveillance of a population can be achieved in several ways. Syndromic surveillance occurs by monitoring clinical manifestations of certain illnesses. This type of surveillance occurs when health-related data, like International Classification of Diseases Ninth Revision (ICD-9) codes, are analyzed to signal possibility of an outbreak. Laboratory surveillance occurs by looking for certain markers or laboratory data. The Laboratory Response Network (LRN) is the United States’ laboratory system for detecting, confirming, and reporting bioterrorism agents. Within the LRN, sentinel laboratories are tasked with singling out suspicious specimens for further testing in higher-tier labs. Environmental surveillance is the process by which the ambient air or the environment is continually sampled for the presence of biological agents [2]. Unfortunately, the practice of bioterrorism surveillance remains poorly studied. A recent systematic review of 29 biosurveillance systems concluded that there is insufficient evidence to determine which of these systems is best [1]. One thing
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