This paper provides a critical engagement with state-of-the-art research from positive psychology and behavioral genetics that directly challenges social geographers’ working hypothesis that people’s well-being and happiness can dramatically be improved by suitably modifying unjust social arrangements and exploitative economic relations. It is intended to generate interest in this neglected body of work in general and awareness of its politically regressive implications in particular. 1. Introduction As social geographers, we work to uncover misconceived and unfair social arrangements that undermine individual and collective well-being [1]. We assume1 that we can substantially increase quality of life and happiness by replacing those nefarious arrangements with better ones [2–6]. Yet, our assumption has recently been challenged by a massive body of empirical work in positive psychology2 and behavioral genetics (see the review by [7], and the references cited therein), which suggests that people’s level of happiness depends largely on their genetic3 make-up. In what follows, I review these worrying findings, and then end the paper with some thoughts as to how social geographers could begin to grapple with this politically regressive provocation4. 2. Chance and Happiness Martin Seligman, the founding father of positive psychology, argues ([8–10]; see also [11, 12]) that the empirical research on happiness in the last few decades can be conveniently encapsulated in a threefold formula: H = S + C + V, where H is happiness, S is one’s genetic set point5, C includes the geographical-environmental conditions of one’s life, and V refers to factors under voluntary control. The most important and most sobering discovery in the field is that happiness is largely a stochastic phenomenon [13] and that each individual’s emotional states are attracted in the long run by a specific genetic set point [14]. One can force oneself to be cheerful with conscious effort for a longer period but soon after one stops the conscious effort, the average level of mood returns6 to one’s set point [15]. Affective neuroscience has recently uncovered the brain geographies that underpin these different set points. Davidson revealed experimentally ([16]; see also [17]) that a cheerful mood has its neurological correlates in increased left-brain activity, whereas a depressed mood intensifies right-brain activity. His research resonates with Coren’s earlier work on left-handedness [18]. Coren investigated why left-handedness is also called sinistrality and found that the average left-hander
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[1]
I acknowledge the fact that social geographers are a heterogeneous group and that there are differences among them as to the aims of social geography (see, e.g., the contributions in [19]).
[2]
Positive psychology is the study of the determinants and components of happiness and well-being. For an inventory of definitions of happiness and an analysis of the relation between the often-conflated concepts of happiness and well-being, see [9, 10, 55].
[3]
For a detailed explanation of genes and genetic mechanisms and their relationship with epigenetics see [20, 33].
[4]
It is important to keep in mind the fact that positive psychologists are themselves a highly heterogeneous group, with some (the hedonic tradition) more inclined towards behavioral genetics, whereas others (the eudaimonic tradition) remain closer in spirit to the older and far less threatening ideals of Maslow’s humanistic psychology. In this paper, as I am about to show, I am primarily worried by the research undertaken by the first group. For the most recent developments within the eudaimonic tradition, see [56, 57].
[5]
The brain is a self-organising structure that maintains its long-term equilibrium through an intricate network of negative feedback loops. Whereas wide short-term fluctuations in happiness are possible, over the long-term, these negative feedback loops ensure that one’s level of happiness homeostatically reverts to its set point (i.e., its average), itself, a function of the particular variants of genes (allele) that an individual happens to possess (cf. [7, 15]; for the first statistical demonstration of the existence of set points for happiness, see [14]).
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Note, however, that the constructivist school of thought in affective neuroscience has launched the argument that persistent conscious effort (e.g., relearning through long-term psychotherapy) might create new brain pathways that, in time, become entrenched and, therefore, make relapse to darker moods less likely [58].
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This is because most left-handers have dominating right-brain activity (cf. [18]).
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It is important to recall that the relation between genes, environments, and volition is subtle, highly interactive, and therefore, complex. See, for example, the comprehensive discussion in [7, 20].
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It is encouraging that, despite knowledge of a genetic set point for happiness since the mid-1990s, research on the social, political, and environmental determinants of happiness has not been stifled by it. See, for example, the Well-being in Developing Countries research, or the many articles on socioenvironmental aspects of happiness published in the Journal of Happiness Studies (over 300 articles), Social Indicators Research (over 500 articles), and the Journal of Socio-Economics. From an epistemological standpoint, however, this kind of research will be less valuable than it seems if it fails, as it so often does, to statistically control for the confounding effects of genes.
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We have to be aware in this context of the danger of unwittingly reciting one of neoliberalism’s favored tropes (but see [59]).
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This should not be construed to mean that the familial environment is totally irrelevant. The problem addressed is the relative ranking of the relevant causal factors.
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More specifically, the beneficial active and emotional coping styles can be taught; it is next to impossible for individuals trapped into an avoidant coping style to bootstrap themselves out of it without external help (cf. [48]).
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There is a growing critical engagement of geographers with the literatures on genetics and the biological sciences, more generally. See, for example, [50, 52] and chapter 8 in [39] and the references cited therein.
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For critiques within psychology of logical positivism and methodological individualism see, for example, [60–62]. These critiques make it possible to contest on principled grounds some of the loftier claims of positive psychology.
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