国家审计“监”与“督”对国有企业资产保值增值的影响
The Impact of State Auditing "Monitoring" and "Supervising" on the Preservation and Appreciation of State-owned Enterprises Assets

利用2010-2017年审计署公布的中央企业审计结果公告，以督促国有资产保值增值为导向，从国有企业审计查出问题数量与处理处罚金额两个方面出发，研究国家审计“监”与“督”关系的处理对国企资产保值增值的影响，并据此构建更有效测度国企审计质量的衡量指标。研究发现：国企审计查出问题数量即“监”的情况与国企资产保值增值没有显著相关性，而在此基础上实施的处理处罚金额即“督”的情况能显著促进国企资产保值增值。这说明，国企审计不能仅满足于“监”，而应当努力进行“督”。进一步研究发现，相比已有研究文献，使用国企审计处理处罚金额与查出问题数量的比率作为国企审计监督质量的测度指标更直接和有区分度，以此为依据进行国企审计相关研究，可提高研究的科学性。
This paper uses the data of the central enterprise group company as the audit results released by the National Audit Office from 2010 to 2017, which reflects the discovery of the amount of problems and punishment money two aspects to study the impact of the handling of the "monitoring" and "supervising" relationship on the preservation and appreciation of state-owned enterprises assets, through which we can construct a more effective substitute index for audit quality of state-owned enterprises. We find that the number of problems detected by state-owned enterprises audit and preservation and appreciation of state-owned enterprises assets has no significant correlation, and the amount of punishment money detected by state-owned enterprises audit can significantly promote the preservation and appreciation of state-owned enterprises assets. This shows that auditing of state-owned enterprises cannot be satisfied with "monitoring" but should strive to carry out "supervising". Further research shows that, the ratio of the amount of the penalty amount and the number of problems detected by state-owned enterprises audit is significantly positively correlated with the increase of the state-owned enterprises assets, the index is more direct and distinguishable. Therefore, this index is more scientific to measure the audit quality of state-owned enterprises.