海归高管、政治关系与盈余管理
Overseas Educated Managers, Political Connections and Earnings Management

以2009—2013年中国创业板公司为样本，考察海归高管是否显著地降低了公司盈余管理水平，并进一步探讨了海归高管对盈余管理的治理作用是否会因政治关系的建立而减弱。结果显示：无论是应计盈余管理还是真实盈余管理，海归高管都表现出显著的抑制作用，但当其具有政治关系时，对盈余管理的抑制作用会显著被减弱。
Based on the data of Chinese GEM-listed companies during 2009-2013, this paper systematically investigates whether overseas educated managers decrease earnings management. Further, this paper discusses whether the governance effect on earnings management of overseas educated managers will weaken with their political connections established. The results show that, overseas educated managers are associated with a lower degree of both accrual-based and real earnings management, but their political connections established will mitigate this governance effect.