财政分权、政府干预行为与地区不良贷款——基于省级面板数据实证分析
Fiscal Decentralization, Government Intervention and Regional Non-performing Loans——An Empirical Analysis Based on Provincial Data of China

基于我国2006-2015年31个省（市、自治区）的面板数据，使用动态面板模型的GMM估计，检验财政分权、政府干预行为对地区不良贷款的影响。结果发现：财政分权与地区不良贷款规模呈正相关，即财政分权水平较高的地区会导致不良贷款的增加；分权下政府干预行为对地区不良贷款的作用也存在显著差异，中部地区的政府干预行为会抑制不良贷款的增加，而东、西部地区的政府干预行为则相反。
Based on the panel data of 31 provinces (municipalities and autonomous regions) in China in 2006-2015 years, this paper applies the GMM technique to examine the impact of fiscal decentralization and government intervention on regional non-performing loans. The results are as follows: (1) The fiscal decentralization is positively correlated with the scale of non-performing loans in the region, which means that the higher level of fiscal decentralization will lead to the increase of non-performing loans; and (2) The government intervention under decentralization also has an important impact on regional non-performing loans. Among them, the excessive intervention in the East and the West regions plays a negative role, but the central part shows a positive effect.