Conflict and compromise in planning decision

Economic decentralization in China has intensified the tension between higher-level and local governments in policy implementation. It is a core development right for local governments in urbanizing China to have construction land quotas determined in local plans. Negotiation around this quota can reveal the hidden rules and operating mechanisms of organizational structures in the urban development field. This paper undertakes a long-term tracing of a planning process in a case study area to reveal the conflicts and bargaining processes that occur when top-down enforcement of relevant policies deviates from or even contradicts local appeals and development goals. This study found that the local governments initially adopted a passive response in order to encourage the opportunity for informal bargaining to maximize their own benefits. The outcome was that higher-level government created incentives and offered flexibility in policy implementation to compensate local government. The role of the planning group in effective information delivery and technical support accelerated consensus reaching with compromise from both higher-level and local governments